Denver Law Review
Volume 7

Issue 5

Article 4

January 1930

Recent Trial Court Decisions
Dicta Editorial Board

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Recent Trial Court Decisions, 7 Dicta 27 (1930).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

RECENT TRIAL COURT DECISIONS
(Eorrom's NOTE: It is intended in each issue of Dicta to note interesting decisions
of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the new Tenth Circuit, although
such are not trial decisions, the United States District Court, the Denver District
Court, the County Court, and occasionally the Juvenile Court.)

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS--10th CIRCUIT-

Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. Daisy
Fanning.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for
the District of Colorado. Decided January 27, 1930. Opinion
by Judge Lewis.
Facts.-Appellee on evening of March 2, 1927, at the
request of her husband, was riding with him in an automobile
on the way to a dance. The evening was very foggy. The
husband was driving the automobile at a rate of 12 miles per
hour. The highway passed over a bridge maintained by the
Railway Company which spanned a deep cut in which the
tracks of the Railway Company lay. Fifteen feet of the
road contiguous to and approaching the bridge was within the
railway's right of way. At the side of this approach, there
was a deep washout. The automobile went into the washout
and as a result appellee was injured. The complaint alleged
that the Railway Company was negligent in failing to fill in
the washout or maintain proper barriers. The jury found
for the appellee and a judgment was entered against the railway company on a verdict. The .railway company alleged
two principal errors: 1. That a fog would not necessarily
be anticipated by the railway company and that therefore
there was no proximate causation of the injury. 2. That the
question of negligence of appellee's husband should have been
submitted to the jury, and if he were negligent, such negligence should be imputable to appellee.
Held.-I. The issue of negligence and proximate causation was properly submitted to the jury. The washout in this
instance was on defendant's right of way and the defendant
would be responsible for its continuance. Landowners whose
properties adjoin adjacent public highways are bound to regulate their conduct and maintain an unguarded excavation on
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their premises in contemplation of the persons who travel upon
such highways. A reasonably prudent person should have
anticipated injury in this instance.
2. Negligence of the operator of a motor vehicle is not
imputable to a guest or passenger of such vehicle, and this
applies as well between a husband and wife as any other passenger or guest, unless the relation is such as to entitle the passenger to give direction, e. g. master and servant. This latter
relation did not exist in the instant case.
Judgment Affirmed.
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS--10th CIRCUIT-

C. I. T. Corporation vs. United States of America.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for
the District of Kansas. Decided January 29, 1930. Opinion
by Judge Cotteral.
Facts.-One Humbred was convicted for the transportation and possession of intoxicating liquors. A Reo coupe
which was in his hands was confiscated by the Government.
Plaintiff intervenor, at the time said Reo coupe was sold, had
taken an assignment of the conditional sales contract of the
automobile from the seller, and in this action sought possession
of the coupe under said sale contract or petitioned to have a
mortgage enforced thereon for the amount of the unpaid balance of the contract. Section 40-Title 27 of the U. S. Code
provides that any vehicle seized in the transportation of intoxicating liquors shall be ordered sold by the court "unless
good cause to the contrary is shown." The District Court
ordered a sale of this automobile. Intervenor appealed.
Held.-The intervenor had a lien interest under the sale
contract. Such interest is sufficient "good cause" and was
"created" without guilty notice to the intervenor. The intervenor therefore is awarded possession of the Reo coupe if its
value is less than the claim. If the automobile has been sold
then the net proceeds of the sale shall be turned over to intervenor or if the proceeds exceed the claim, the excess shall be
paid to the Treasury of the United States. Order Reversed;
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and case remanded for the entry of an order in accord with
the opinion.*
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS-10th CIRCUIT-

Blackburn Construction Company vs. Cedar Rapids National Bank.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for
the Eastern District of Oklahoma. Decided January 24, 1930.
Opinion by Judge Cotteral.
Facts.-Plaintiffin the lower court brought an action on
two promissory notes. The only material defense was that
of payment. At the conclusion of the trial, both sides moved
for a directed verdict. The Court thereupon ruled that the
motions withdrew the case from the jury and submitted it to
the court. After reviewing the testimony, the Judge directed
a verdict for the plaintiff bank and rendered a judgment on
such verdict. The defendant alleged error, first, in directing
a verdict for plaintiff and not for defendant; second, that the
court failed to submit additional instructions to the jury on
the issue of the discharge of the notes by payment.
'Held.-Motions by both parties for a directed verdict
without request for instructions are regarded as joint requests
for findings of fact by the court and a direction to the jury in
accordance with such findings and the law applicable to them,
thereby withdrawing the case from the jury. On appeal
therefor, the sole question open to review is whether or not
the findings of the court are based on substantial evidence and
the law correctly applied. This court having reviewed the
evidence finds it sufficient to support the findings of the District Judge.
Judgment Affirmed.
DENVER DISTRICT COURT-No. 100,086-DIV. 1-Quinn and

McGill Motor Supply Co. vs. Broadway Improvement &
Investment Co., et al.-Hon.Frank McDonough, Judge.
Facts.-One Brown leased certain premises from defendant Investment Company and remained in possession of the
*EDITOR'S NOTE: Compare the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court in Lindsley
v. Warner noted on page 33 of Dicta for February, 1930.
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premises until August 13, 1927. On that date plaintiff took
possession of the premises and certain property described in
a chattel mortgage executed in its favor by Brown, this property being located on said premises. Plaintiff removed the
property described in the mortgage, with the exception of an
electric sign. The last of this property being -removed on
August 13, 1927. The keys to the premises were then delivered to a representative of the Investment Company. The
electric sign in question was affixed to the building by heavy
iron bars which pierced the brick walls and by rods bolted to
the roof. Defendant Investment Company having found a
new tenant for the premises who insisted that the sign be removed, sold the sign in question for $200.00 -and the purchasers removed the same. The lease contained the following
provisions: "No hole shall be made or drilled in the stone or
brick work of said premises." "No alterations, additions or
fixtures of any kind shall be made to the premises without the
written consent of lessor endorsed on this agreement. All
such additions or fixtures shall, on the termination of this
agreement, remain and be the property of the lessor unless
otherwise agreed in writing by endorsement on this leese."
"Each tenant must upon termination of the tenancy hereby
created restore the keys of the demised premises to the lessor
or his agent." Plaintiff made a demand for said sign on November 25, 1927, and upon refusal of such demand filed this
action for conversion.
Trial was had before the Court.
Held.-1. The electric sign in question having been affixed to the building became the property of the landlord
according to the terms of the lease, and the attempt to include
it in the chattel mortgage to plaintiff was without right as
against the interest of lessor.
2. That the keys to the premises had been surrendered
to the owner and the premises had been abandoned by the
tenant as well as the mortgagee; that the demand and the
assertion of right to the sign by plaintiff company was a mere
after thought, and the plaintiff cannot recover therefor because of the abandonment of the property.
Judgment for Defendant.

